INTRODUCTION
Julian West was born a Boston Brahmin in 1857. At age 29, he was engaged to be married to Edith Bartlett, whom he described as wealthy, beautiful, and graceful. Their marriage awaited only the completion of a new house, which West was attempting to build in "one of the most desirable parts of the city, that is to say, a part chiefly inhabited by the rich." 1 Although West owned his own home, it was, in his words, "not a house to which I could think of bringing a bride, much less so dainty a one as Edith Bartlett.", 2 But construction on the new house had been repeatedly delayed by labor strikes. Later recounting his frustration at these strikes, West wrote:
What the specific causes of these strikes were I do not remember. Strikes had become so common at that period that people had ceased to inquire into their particular grounds. In one department of industry or another, they had been nearly incessant ever since the great business crisis of 1873. In fact, it had come to be the exceptional thing to see any class of laborers pursue their avocation steadily for more than a few months at a time. 3 On the evening of May 30, 1887-after spending the day with Edith and her family-West retired to his home. He was exhausted after suffering from insomnia the previous two nights. So severe was his affliction that he had built a secret, soundproof chamber under the foundations. Even this extreme measure, however, sometimes failed to produce the desired results. On these occasions, West solicited the assistance of Doctor Pillsbury, a self-proclaimed "Professor of Animal Magnetism." 4 Doctor Pillsbury had the ability to "mesmerize" West, placing him in a "deep slumber, which continued until [he] was aroused by a reversal of the mesmerizing process." 5 On this particular night, West asked his servant to summon Doctor Pillsbury, who came only reluctantly because his was preparing to leave Boston that very night to pursue a new professional opportunity in New Orleans. Nevertheless, Doctor Pillsbury visited West, who submitted to the treatment after giving instructions to his servant to be awakened at 9:00 a.m. the next morning.
When West was finally awakened, he did not see the face of his servant, but the face of a stranger, who identified himself as Dr. Leete. West found himself in a house he had never before seen and when he demanded an explanation, the reluctant Dr. Leete told him that the date was September 10, 2000. West had slept for 133 years, three months, and eleven days.
West's tale appears in Looking Backward, a novel by Edward Bellamy, first published in 1888. Looking Backward describes Bellamy's utopian vision through West's eyes as he explores the differences between Boston in the year 2000 and the Boston of his youth. Much of the book recounts conversations between West and Dr. Leete, an educated and inquisitive man who gradually introduces West to the strange new world. West also occasionally ventures out to see the new world with Dr. Leete's beautiful daughter, Edith. 6 In Bellamy's utopia, West finds a society in which everyone is equal, not only in material wealth, but also in dignity. It is a world with clean air (because people no longer use combustion to heat their homes), no jails (for "lying has gone out of fashion" 7 ), and no military organizations (because the "civilized" world is united in a great economic community). There are no taxes because there is no private property; everything, beyond limited personal effects, is owned by the national government. (Note that it is not a "federal" government, because the states have been eliminated.)
The national government exists primarily to direct the affairs of the nation's industrial operations, and for this function, there is no need for lawyers. Accordingly, Bellamy-who labored for a brief time as a practicing attorney-eliminates them completely. After all, in the words of Dr. Leete, "It would not seem truth, that persons should take part in the proceedings who had an acknowledged motive to color it." 8 The persistent question that occupies Julian West throughout the novel is how this utopia could have been achieved without a basic change in human nature. When West entered the state of suspended animation in 1887, the problem consuming American society was the "labor question"-that is, the problem of reconciling employers and workers. 9 Dr. Leete, living in a world after the labor question had been resolved, analyzes the problem with admirable simplicity. According to Dr. Leete, the labor question arose in the nineteenth century because of the unprecedented concentration of capital, which displaced numerous entrepreneurial businesses and replaced them with "great corporations."' 0 The rise of these great corporations could not be curtailed, despite popular opposition, because "even its victims.., were forced to admit the prodigious increase of efficiency which had been imparted to the national industries, the vast economies effected by concentration of management and unity of organization, and to confess that since the new system had taken the place of the old the wealth of the world had increased at a rate before undreamed of."" Dr. Leete's account seems strangely contradictory. On the one hand, corporations caused resentment because they forced people who previously had been able to survive independently to subject themselves to the whim of the great capitalists. On the other hand, those same people acknowledged the power of the great corporations to improve their lives (to dismantle the great corporations "would have involved returning to the day of stage-coaches" 1 2 ), and thus they would not attempt to turn back the clock. The problem, quite simply, was a distributional one: "[T]he vast increase had gone chiefly to make the rich richer, increasing the gap between them and the poor."' ' 3 What West learns under the tutelage of Dr. Leete is that people have not fundamentally changed, but rather that the structure of society has changed. Somehow, while West slept, society had made a conscious decision to pursue equality with full conviction. The public policy that ushered in this new era was nationalization of all industry.
Dr. Leete describes the "logical evolution"' 14 from a capitalist society, in which industry was increasingly concentrated, to a nationalized economy that would "open a golden future to humanity"I1:
Early in the last century the evolution was completed by the final consolidation of the entire capital of the nation. The industry and commerce of the country, ceasing to be conducted by a set of irresponsible corporations and syndicates of private persons at their caprice and for their profit, were intrusted [sic] to a single syndicate representing the people, to be conducted for the common interest for the common profit. The nation, that is to say, organized as the one great business corporation in which all other corporations were absorbed; it became the one capitalist in the place of all other capitalists, the sole employer, the final monopoly in which all previous and lesser monopolies were swallowed up, a monopoly in the profits and economies of which all citizens shared.
16
Looking Backward was a publishing bonanza, selling 300,000 copies in its second year of publication.
17
In the wake of its publication, Bellamy Nationalist Clubs formed across the United States, and though the nationalist movement fizzled by the mid-1890s, Bellamy's vision of corporations brought to heel by the government left an enduring mark on the American psyche. In 1935, Charles Beard, John Dewey, and Edward Weeks each listed Looking Backward as the second most influential book written since 1885, behind only Das Kapital.
1 s
As one of the major works addressing the role of corporations in society during the Gilded Age, 19 Looking Backward serves as a marker by which to measure the progress of the "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) movement. In some ways, the modem version of CSR seems light years from Bellamy's nationalization nightmare, as CSR scholarship has become increasingly diverse and sophisticated. 21 Nevertheless, CSR remains tightly focused on ("Corporate law, like most law, is primarily about the rule-oriented structuring of social power, and it is specifically about the rules that structure the organization of economic power. Corporate law is primarily concerned with business, that is, the structure of economic power in the form of its institutions and processes. Its subject is not primarily economics, although economic policy must obviously play a central role in the development of corporate law. The most basic rules of corporate law involve the structure and governance of businesses that 'incorporate,' which means simply filing with a state government 'founding documents' (usually a certificate of incorporation and any required supporting documents). Beyond the ministerial requirements of the founding act, corporate law also structures and, at least to a certain extent, circumscribes the activities of incorporated businesses and the participants associated with them. Moreover, the powers and restrictions of corporate law are formulated with a view (at least in theory) toward achieving a set of rules for incorporated businesses that conduce to the public advantage."). 30 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1(1976).
The rules that define the decisionmaking structure of corporations are both "power-conferring" and "duty-imposing.' '31 The locus of power in the corporation is the board of directors, which possesses a "large reservoir of authority. ' 32 In a typical corporation, much of this management authority is delegated to officers, though the extent of such delegations is regulated more by custom than by positive corporate law.
33
The board of directors exercises its authority subject to the will of the shareholders, who are entitled to determine the composition of the board. 34 The rules of corporate law that constitute the board of directors, officers, and shareholders and allocate authority among them are the "powerconferring" rules. The "duty-imposing" rules limit the exercise of authority, partly through substantive constraints, but mostly through procedural constraints. 
44
The power of the board of directors may be limited by a corporation's constitutional documents. See, e.g., id. § 102(b)(l) (allowing the certificate of incorporation to contain "any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders... if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this State"); id. § 109(b) (authorizing bylaws that "contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees"). The extent to which shareholders are allowed to limit the authority of the board of directors through shareholder- In 2006, the Delaware legislature adopted amendments to title 8, section 216, of the Delaware Code, providing in relevant part, "A bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors." The synopsis of the bill expressly limited the effect of this amendment to section 216, thus leaving open the general issue of the viability of shareholder-adopted bylaws:
Section 5 Amends § 216 to provide that a bylaw adopted by a vote of stockholders that prescribes the required vote for the election of directors may not be altered or repealed by the board of directors. This amendment does not address any other situation in which the board of directors amends a bylaw adopted by stockholder vote.
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In modem corporation statutes, the most important constraints on director power are procedural, not substantive. In broad brush, good procedure requires unbiased directors 45 who consider "all material information reasonably available."
46 Shareholders frequently contest director elections,
48
claiming procedural flaws, both under state law and federal securities laws. In addition to technical requirements of statutes and regulations, courts impose on directors duties of care, loyalty, and good faith, all of which are primarily procedural duties.
49
Viewed as a whole, the "power-conferring" and "duty-imposing" rules discussed above-along with the ancillary rules regulating the formation of the corporation°-50 are the rules that comprise "corporate law." Professor
Greenfield believes that we can change the world for the better by improving these rules. More specifically, he focuses on board composition and shareholder primacy. 51 In the ensuing Parts, I will argue that changes in corporate law cannot eradicate poverty or materially change existing distributions of wealth, except by impairing the creation of wealth. Changes in corporate law will not clean our air or our water. And changes in corporate law will not solve the labor question. Indeed, the only changes in corporate law that will have a substantial effect on such issues are changes that will make the world worse, not better. 
II. DOES CORPORATE LAW MATTER?
This question lies at the heart of my disagreement with Professor Greenfield, who proclaims, "Corporate law is a big deal. 53 Ask most corporate governance scholars whether corporate law matters, and you risk receiving a disquisition on the connection between corporate law and stock price or profitability. 54 For Professor Greenfield, by contrast, the question of whether corporate law matters triggers a more expansive inquiry about the effect of corporate actions on labor relations, the environment, and human rights.
55
If corporate law is fundamentally about the process of corporate decisionmaking, as asserted above, possible strategies for reform are twofold:
(1) changing the decisionmaker (Professor Greenfield's reform efforts are aimed at the board of directors, though recent work on increasing the role of shareholders also speak to this issue 56 ); or (2) changing the decision rule (the "shareholder primacy norm"). Like other aspiring reformers before him, Professor Greenfield explores both options. To sustain his claim that "corporate law is a big deal, 57 Professor Greenfield must persuade us not only that changing the composition of the board of directors or changing the Even if Black's "triviality hypothesis" proved correct, corporate law would nonetheless remain important. Even if corporate law were entirely enabling, it would describe the rules by which economic power is socially structured, which is not a trivial matter, although corporate law would then collapse into a specialized category of contract and property law.
Orts, supra note 29, at 1582. 55 See Greenfield, supra note 25, at 950 ("By establishing the obligations and priorities of companies and their management, corporate law affects everything from the return on shareholder equity, to employees' wage rates (whether in Silicon Valley or Bangladesh), to whether companies will try to skirt environmental laws, to whether they will tend to look the other way when doing business with governments that violate human rights."). 64 Professor Greenfield cleverly turns economic analysis against its practitioners:
The stakeholder board, in an ironic sense, is a genuine realization of the "nexus of contracts" view of the firm. If the firm is best seen as a microcosm of the market, then let us be honest about recognizing all contracts by putting the most important market participants in a position where they can be heard at the decisionmaking level of the firm. The specifics will be difficult, but not impossible: employees could elect a proportion of the board; communities in which the company employs a significant percentage of the workforce could be asked to propose a representative for the board; long-term business partners and creditors could be represented as well.
Professor Greenfield's proposal is reminiscent of Abram Chayes's 1959 proposal to allow non-shareholder constituencies to participate in "[t]heir rightful share in decisions on the exercise of corporate power" by electing representatives to the board of directors.
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While Professor Greenfield reassures us that "specifics will be difficult, but not impossible,"
66 Ralph Nader was not so sanguine: "It seems impossible to design a general 'interest group' formula which will assure that all affected constituencies of large industrial corporations will be represented and that all constituencies will be given appropriate weight."
67
Even if the logistics of this proposal could be worked out, the likelihood that it would substantially alter corporate decisionmaking is vanishingly small. proposed instead that each director be given "a separate oversight responsibility, a separate expertise, and a separate constituency so that each public concern would be guaranteed at least one informed representative on the board." Id. at 125. While modem boards of directors typically do not include a director who is expressly identified as an expert on "employee welfare" or "consumer protection," they do include "financial experts," who comprise the audit committee. The reality is that labor-management relations were not transformed by employee ownership, but remain in a steady state of ongoing strife. This is due to a number of factors, not the least of which is an industry-wide culture of conflict, and class and gender distinctions among various union-represented groups. In and of itself, employee ownership barely raises its head as an issue except at shareholder meetings. Indeed, while employees collectively own over have [sic] of the common stock, the real control of the company is still exerted by a small handful of senior executives, bankers, and other companies who act as both suppliers of capital goods and operating money.
mixed, at best. 77 These arguments raise an obvious question: If diversity is value-enhancing, why don't corporations pursue a policy of diversity voluntarily? One possibility is the so-called "pool problem." 78 Another possibility is that entrenched incumbents receive private benefits from the status quo or are motivated by a desire to exclude women or racial or ethnic minorities. Of course, a third possibility is that diversity is not valueenhancing. Professor Greenfield's reliance on business rationales to support his argument for diversity is surprising, given his general willingness to eschew business rationales in favor of other considerations, such as social justice. I suspect that Professor Greenfield views increased diversity as inherently good, even though he feels obliged to defend his proposal on efficiency grounds. Interestingly, on traditional measures of corporate social responsibility, board diversity appears to be ineffectual. 79 Moreover, the benefits inherent in board diversity may be diluted by linking diversity with business outcomes. Lisa Fairfax has recently concluded that business rationales for racial and ethnic diversity "promise more-and in some cases significantly more-than directors of color can realistically deliver." 80 As a result, using the business We find evidence that low-profitability firms respond to their business troubles by following conventional wisdom and increasing the proportion of independent directors on their boards. There is no evidence, however, that this strategy works. Firms with more independent boards (proxied by the fraction of independent directors minus the fraction of inside directors) do not achieve improved profitability, and there are hints in our data that they perform worse than other firms. This evidence suggests that the conventional wisdom on the importance of board independence lacks empirical support. Board size also shows no consistent correlation with firm performance, though we find hints of the negative correlation found in other studies.
The notion that independent boards of directors should improve performance depends on the assumption that conflict-of-interest transactions are a material drag on corporate performance. But this assumption may be misplaced. As noted by Jill Fisch:
[T]he focus on independence as a criterion for evaluating board structure may place undue emphasis on the monitoring role of the corporate board while ignoring its management function. Although director independence may enhance the board's ability to monitor effectively, this gain may come at the expense of a decline in the board's management capacity. This analysis suggests that the normative vision of independence currently embraced by the corporate governance movement is a vision that imposes costs as well as benefits upon corporations that respond to the reform pressure. 85 In addition, as part of those Enron-era reforms, the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq have adopted more stringent definitions of director independence. 86 Each of the foregoing examples of changing the decisionmaker has its own peculiar history and back story, but together they support the notion that, over a broad swath of firms, corporate decisionmaking on matters of corporate social responsibility is not highly responsive to changes in board composition. Perhaps this should not be surprising, given the extent to which modem corporations in the U.S. already take account of social considerations. [Vol. 57 governance. ' 9° Thus, while changes in board composition may work marginal changes in corporate decisionmaking, the likelihood that Professor Greenfield's proposals would "save the world" is remote.
B. Changing the Decision Rule
Edward Bellamy was a clever man, and he anticipated the question that would naturally occur to his readers: Would the utopian world described by Dr.
Leete require a fundamental change in human nature? In response to a similar question asked by Julian West, Dr. Leete stated: "I don't think there has been any change in human nature in that respect since your day. It is still so constituted that special incentives in the form of prizes and advantages to be gained, are requisite to call out the best endeavors of the average man in any direction."
9 ' Nevertheless, the people in Dr. Leete's day seem to experience life differently from Julian West's people. Again, from Dr. Leete:
If I were to give you, in one sentence, a key to what may seem the mysteries of our civilization as compared with that of your age, I should say that it is the fact that the solidarity of the race and the brotherhood of man, which to you were but fine phrases, are, to our thinking and feeling, ties as real and as vital as physical fraternity.
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Professor Greenfield hopes to work a similar change in the attitudes of directors, not by changing their fundamental nature, but by changing the decision rule that governs their deliberations. 93 Like many before him, Professor Greenfield criticizes the shareholder-centric focus of corporate 90 Admittedly, the extent to which corporations in the U.S. serves various stakeholders may depend in large part on the predilections of shareholders. Cynthia Williams and John Conley provide an interesting comparison between corporations in the U.S. and the U.K. Both countries "share a pattern of widely dispersed share ownership," and both "have well-developed securities markets, and both depend upon similar mechanisms to promote managerial accountability, including financial transparency, stock market valuations, and the market for corporate control. decisionmaking. 94 His argument is straightforward and powerful: "Corporate law should not presume, without strong arguments, to prohibit corporate decisionmakers from taking into account the very societal interests that the corporation is ultimately meant to serve." 95 While many corporate governance scholars defend the shareholder primacy norm as an essential feature of the corporate governance system, 96 I prefer to respond with a shrug of the shoulders. The problem with Professor Greenfield's argument is not that the shareholder primacy norm is an essential foundation stone in the corporate governance system, but that the shareholder primacy norm is both unenforced and unenforceable. As a result, "the shareholder primacy norm may be one of the most overrated doctrines in corporate law." It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears. The problem with using shareholder primacy to focus on managerial conflicts is that the beneficiary of the conflicted managers' duty is superfluous.
Larry Mitchell has observed:
[I]t is enough to prohibit directorial self-dealing to recognize that directors have no legitimate financial interest in the property they manage that would permit them to use any portion of that property to further their own interests.
Although logical, the correlative statement that these transactions should be precluded in the interest of the stockholders is not necessary: the older formulation focusing 315 n.186 (showing that citations to Dodge for this premise are found much more often in law review articles than in court cases).
' giving stockholders much-needed protection against self-seeking managers, to give increased emphasis at the present time to the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders.") (emphasis added).
on the interests of the corporation is adequate. Thus, identifying the beneficiaries of the rule is, to establish this modest principle, of secondary importance.1 0 8
Thus, at the foundation of the Berle-Dodd debate lies the fallacious assumption that the role of the shareholder primacy norm is to police managerial conflicts. Dodd seems to recognize the insignificance of the shareholder primacy norm to the problem of discouraging managerial self-dealing because he expresses sympathy for Berle's project, 1°9 but argues that "experiments" in the direction of socially responsible behavior by corporate managers should not "run counter to fundamental principles of the law of business corporations."
As a legal matter, he is surely right, as Berle conceded 20 years later. ' In The Shareholder Primacy Norm, I observed that "the universal application of the business judgment rule makes the shareholder primacy norm virtually unenforceable against public corporations' managers.""
If courts suddenly changed course, as urged by Professor Greenfield, could they enforce the shareholder primacy norm? In other words, does the shareholder primacy norm provide a tractable decision rule?
13 Economist Michael Jensen suggests that it does not:
Value seeking tells an organization and its participants how their success in achieving a vision or in implementing a strategy will be assessed. But value maximizing or value seeking says nothing about how to create a superior vision or strategy. Nor does it tell employees or managers how to find or establish initiatives or ventures that create value. It only tells them how we will measure success in their activity."' Even though courts do not enforce the shareholder primacy norm, businesses seem quite focused on maximizing profits.'" 5 Some have argued that this drive for profit maximization is spurred in part by the "expressive effect" of the shareholder primacy norm,1 16 though these arguments rest on the mistaken assumption that the shareholder primacy norm is required to deter selfinterested behavior." 7 In any event, given that directors and officers make their decisions in the shadow of the markets described above, the notion that an unenforceable and unenforced legal rule is a powerful determinant of those decisions seems almost fanciful. And Professor Greenfield's claim does not rest on the expressive effect of the shareholder primacy norm, so I will not belabor the point.
III. DYSTOPIA
The usual objection to utopian societies is that their members are required to sacrifice freedom on the altar of equality. Dr. Leete assures West, however, that "liberty is as dear as equality or fraternity" to those in latter-day Boston." Because the shareholder wealth maximization norm is central to director socialization, the norm provides a forceful reminder of where the director's loyalty lies. Even if the business judgment rule renders its rhetoric largely unenforceable, the shareholder wealth maximization norm is an ever-present goad. By removing the psychological constraint that the shareholder wealth maximization norm provides, and by simultaneously exacerbating the two masters problem, we are less likely to encourage directors to pursue the collective interests of the firm's various constituents than to encourage directors to pursue their own self-interests.
Bainbridge, supra note 89, at 582. 118 BELLAMY, supra note 1, at 89. 119 As Dr. Leete asserts, "the nation [had] become the sole capitalist." BELLAMY, supra note 1, at 139.
But to suggest that "capitalism" exists without markets is doublespeak. 120 Id. at 27.
The industry and commerce of the country, ceasing to be conducted by a set of irresponsible corporations and syndicates of private persons at their caprice and for their profit, were intrusted [sic] to a single syndicate representing the people, to be conducted for the common interest and for the common profit. The nation, that is to say, organized as one great business corporation in which all other corporations were absorbed; it became the one capitalist in the place of all the other capitalists, the sole employer, the final monopoly in which all previous and lesser monopolies were swallowed up, a monopoly in the profits and economies of which all citizens shared.... At last, strangely late in the world's history, the obvious fact was perceived that no business is so essentially the public business as the industry and commerce on which the people's livelihood depends, and to entrust it to private persons to be managed for private profit is a folly similar in kind, though vastly greater in magnitude, to that a surrendering the functions of political government to kings and nobles to be conducted for their personal
gratification.
The change was not caused by bloody revolution, but by consensus.
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Ironically, one of the most important changes in the history of U.S. corporate law occurred in 1888, the year that Looking Backward was first published, when New Jersey amended its constitution to allow corporations to hold and dispose of the stock of other corporations. 123 New Jersey was already the leader in the competition for corporate charters, on the strength of its general incorporation statute of 1875, but subsequent reforms in the late 1880s and 1890s strengthened New Jersey's position. On the basis of these reforms, New Jersey became widely known as the "Mother of Corporations" or the "Traitor State."1 24 Other states, including Delaware (in 1899), followed New Jersey's lead by liberalizing their corporation statutes. Moreover, in 1900, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that it was bound by the corporation precedents from the New Jersey courts because the Delaware legislature had adopted many passages of the New Jersey statute in ipsissimis verbis.1 25 Despite copying New Jersey's statutes and cases and offering lower taxes, Delaware was unable 121 id. 122 See id. at 28 (explaining that "the whole mass of people was behind it"). As the beneficiary of this cautionary tale, Delaware wisely has avoided radical innovations in its corporate law. As a result, most ambitious corporate reformers have embraced federal incorporation as the only feasible route to major reform. 127 Though Professor Greenfield has not endorsed a federal incorporation explicitly, he refers to "U.S. corporate law" in his paper, and whatever means he would employ to implement his reforms, the national scope of his ambition is clear.'
28 Just as members of utopian societies may be required to sacrifice freedom on the altar of equality, so Professor Greenfield's proposals would require corporations to forfeit the liberal regulations embedded in state corporate laws for a more constraining federal system. The very real risk, indeed, the almost certain effect, of implementing his proposed reforms would be an exodus of corporations from the United States.
The conventional objection to proposals like Professor Greenfield's is that stakeholder governance leads to diminished accountability of corporate managers. This so-called "two-masters problem" has been thoroughly governance have answered the charge. 130 But that debate is merely a sideshow to the larger concern over the dystopian potential of corporate law. While the "two-masters problem" focuses on the potential for managerial self-dealing, Professor Greenfield's proposal would be problematic even in a world without self-dealing.
The crucial point of departure for this section is the following incontrovertible fact: Professor Greenfield's vision of utopia would require boards of directors to make decisions that sacrifice shareholder value in favor of value for non-shareholder constituencies. When boards of directors are able to enhance employee welfare, make the environment cleaner, or improve human rights throughout the world without impairing shareholder value, they often do it. This is not "corporate social responsibility," but good management. And the failure to pursue such strategies would be a problem of managerial incompetence, not a problem of improper incentives.131 Professor Greenfield's proposals to change the decisionmaker and change the decision rule would have the effect of shifting power and attention away from shareholders and toward non-shareholder constituencies. As Larry Ribstein has observed, "[S]hifting power to stakeholders solves the problem of shareholder opportunism to stakeholders by creating a potentially more serious problem of stakeholder opportunism to shareholders." ' 1 32 The inevitable result would be an increase in the cost of public equity capital that, in turn, might prompt many companies to search for a more hospitable host for incorporation. The present trickle of stock expatriations, motivated by the potential for tax savings,' 33 could become a flood.
Victor Fleischer has observed that stock expatriations are an example of "regulatory-cost engineering," and he asserts that "[t]he puzzle is not why inversion deals take place, but rather why we see so few."' 134 Using the aborted expanding its borders to include non-shareholder constituencies of the corporation. At the heart of this "progressive" vision lies the notion that corporate law matters to issues of distributional equity among various corporate constituencies. A similar motivation animated Edward Bellamy's novel, Looking Backward, and the solutions proposed by Bellamy and Professor Greenfield also are similar: change the decisionmaker and change the decision rule.
In response to Professor Greenfield's challenge, I contend that corporate law does not matter in the way that he claims because powerful markets constrain corporate decisionmaking.
If Professor Greenfield somehow succeeded in materially changing the content of corporate decisions, he would sacrifice potential shareholder value in favor of value for non-shareholder constituencies. In the process, Professor Greenfield's vision of corporate law would destroy much of the good that corporations have done.
